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Abstract
Input distortion is a common problem faced by expert systems, particularly those deployed with a Web
interface. In this study, we develop novel methods to distinguish liars from truth-tellers, and redesign rule-
based expert systems to address such a problem. The four proposed methods are termed split tree (ST),
consolidated tree (CT), value-based split tree (VST), and value-based consolidated tree (VCT), respectively.
Among them, ST and CT aim to increase an expert system’s accuracy of recommendations, and VST and VCT
attempt to reduce the misclassification cost resulting from incorrect recommendations. We observe that ST
and VST are less efficient than CT and VCT in that ST and VST always require selected attribute values to be
verified, whereas CT and VCT do not require value verification under certain input scenarios. We conduct
experiments to compare the performances of the four proposed methods and two existing methods, i.e., the
traditional true tree (TT) method that ignores input distortion and the knowledge modification (KM) method
proposed in prior research. The results show that CT and ST consistently rank first and second, respectively, in
maximizing the recommendation accuracy, and VCT and VST always lead to the lowest and second lowest
misclassification cost. Therefore, CT and VCT should be the methods of choice in dealing with users’ lying
behaviors. Furthermore, we find that KM is outperformed by not only the four proposed methods, but
sometimes even by the TT method. This result further confirms the advantage necessity of differentiating liars
from truth-tellers when both types of users exist in the population.
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Abstract. Input distortion is a common problem faced by expert systems, particularly
those deployed with a Web interface. In this study, we develop novel methods to distin-
guish liars from truth-tellers, and redesign rule-based expert systems to address such a
problem. The four proposedmethods are termed split tree (ST), consolidated tree (CT), value-
based split tree (VST), and value-based consolidated tree (VCT), respectively. Among them, ST
and CT aim to increase an expert system’s accuracy of recommendations, and VST and
VCT attempt to reduce the misclassification cost resulting from incorrect recommenda-
tions. We observe that ST and VST are less efficient than CT and VCT in that ST and VST
always require selected attribute values to be verified, whereas CT and VCT do not require
value verification under certain input scenarios. We conduct experiments to compare the
performances of the four proposed methods and two existing methods, i.e., the traditional
true tree (TT) method that ignores input distortion and the knowledge modification (KM)
method proposed in prior research. The results show that CT and ST consistently rank first
and second, respectively, in maximizing the recommendation accuracy, and VCT and VST
always lead to the lowest and second lowest misclassification cost. Therefore, CT and VCT
should be the methods of choice in dealing with users’ lying behaviors. Furthermore, we
find that KM is outperformed by not only the four proposedmethods, but sometimes even
by the TT method. This result further confirms the advantage necessity of differentiating
liars from truth-tellers when both types of users exist in the population.
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1. Introduction
Since their inception in the mid-1960s, expert systems
have gained tremendous popularity and have been
broadly applied in a wide variety of fields includ-
ing finance, medical treatment, military, and education
(Liao 2005). The benefits of expert systems, such as
helping organizations reduce their personnel cost and
make better decisions, have also beenwell documented
(Duan et al. 2005).
Based on their methods of reasoning, expert systems
can be classified into different categories. In this study,
we focus on rule-based expert systems, which is one
of the most frequently applied types of expert systems
(Liao 2005). Rule-based expert systems are built from
a set of IF-THEN rules. Such rules can be provided
by domain experts or inferred from historical data.
When domain experts construct such decision rules,
they typically assume that the inputs provided by users
at the time of system consultation are accurate. How-
ever, as we will discuss next, this is often not the case
in real-world settings.
1.1. Input Distortion
Input distortion occurs when users do not provide
true data to a rule-based expert system. For instance,
Internet technologies have provided new opportu-
nities for the deployment of expert systems (Power
2000). One of the challenges faced by such systems
is users’ lying behaviors. Hoffman et al. (1999) find
that 95% of the users are reluctant to provide infor-
mation requested by websites. One reason behind this
behavior is the lack of trust between customers and
businesses on the web (Metzger 2004). Users’ concerns
about their privacy and information security prevent
them from revealing true information. Consequently,
users may falsify input data to protect themselves.
Another important factor that contributes to this lying
behavior is that self-interested customers may delib-
erately seek improper benefits by providing incorrect
data. For example, during a credit card application,
users who are not confident about their financial back-
ground may manipulate their personal data to get
approval. Regardless of the causes of lying, firms can
incur significant costs as a result of input distortion.
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One intuitive method to deal with input distortion is
to impose penalty to those caught lying. Keefer (2015)
has reported that falsifying data in a credit applica-
tion could lead to jail time and expensive fines. How-
ever, punishments are often costly to enforce, and thus
may have limited effect on the prevention of input
distortion.
Since input distortion is practically impossible to
completely eliminate, one may suggest that all user
inputs be manually verified to ascertain their accu-
racy. However, manually verifying user inputs for fre-
quently used expert systems is typically costly and
time-consuming. In this study, we focus on automatic
approaches to address users’ lying to rule-based expert
systems.
1.2. Literature Review
Lying behavior has long been studied by researchers.
One research stream deals with deception detection.
Previous studies suggest that it is possible to use ver-
bal and nonverbal cues to detect deception (Buller
and Burgoon 1996, George et al. 2004). In addition,
researchers have proposed methods to detect decep-
tion via linguistic cues (Zhou et al. 2003, 2008; Zhou
and Zhang 2008). However, these techniques for decep-
tion detection cannot be directly applied to address
users’ lying behavior in our problem context. For
example, during an online credit card application, an
applicant may only input numeric and simple text
information (e.g., name and address). Without face-to-
face contact, it is impossible to capture nonverbal or
verbal cues that are critically important for deception
detection. Similarly, without rich text information, the
linguisticmethods cannot be applied. Furthermore, the
aforementioned studies on deception detection do not
address input distortion for rule-based expert systems.
In another stream of investigation, researchers have
developed sophisticated techniques to detect various
types of fraud, such as management fraud (Cecchini
et al. 2010), financial fraud (Abbasi et al. 2012), and fake
websites (Abbasi et al. 2010). The methods proposed in
this stream of research typically require training data
that includes a set of fraud cues or contextual informa-
tion as well as known classifications. Such techniques
cannot be directly applied to the problem addressed in
this study when the required fraud clues and contex-
tual information are unavailable.
The prior literature has also proposed methods to
handle noise in the knowledge base that can affect the
effectiveness of expert systems. One way of dealing
with noisy data is enhancing the quality of training
data. Various solutions, such as class noise identifica-
tion (Zhu et al. 2003) andmissing attribute value impu-
tation (Rubin 2004) have been proposed. More recently,
Boylu et al. (2010) adapt support vector machines
(SVM) to generate classifications; their method takes
into consideration users’ possible strategic behavior
such as data distortion. These solutions require that
a similar error pattern exist in training and testing
data, and hence cannot be used to address users’
input distortions that only occur at the time of system
consultation.
To the best of our knowledge, only one prior study
addresses the problem considered in the present
research, i.e., distorted data are fed into a rule-based
expert system that assumes all input values are correct.
To cope with such input distortion, Jiang et al. (2005)
proposed two novel methods to improve the accuracy
of recommendations. The first method, knowledge mod-
ification (or KM), generates a new decision tree (termed
KM tree) based on experts’ decision rules as well as
users’ lying patterns. At the time of system consulta-
tion, users’ input data is directly fed into the modified
decisions tree. The second method, input modification
(IM), still uses the decision tree built from decision
rules provided by experts, but modifies a user’s input
data at the time of consultation. The prior study shows
that both KM and IM lead to a significantly improved
accuracy rate than the traditional methods that ignore
input distortion, with KM outperforming IM in practi-
cally all tested scenarios.
Although the KM method proposed by Jiang et al.
(2005) increases the accuracy of recommendations, the
method has two limitations. First, the generated KM
tree does not differentiate liars from truth-tellers at
the time of consultation. Since the KM method essen-
tially assumes that every user is a liar, it is not effec-
tive when there are both liars and truth-tellers in the
underlying user population. Second, the KM method
does not consider misclassification costs when making
recommendations. In real-world settings, misclassifi-
cation costs are often asymmetric. For instance, classi-
fying a nontrustworthy customer as a trustworthy one
could be more costly than classifying a trustworthy
customer as a nontrustworthy one. The KM method
maximizes the expected accuracy of recommendations
while completely ignoring such misclassification costs.
This could lead to suboptimal decisions under real-
world applications.
1.3. Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, no prior study differen-
tiates liars from truth-tellers, and considers misclassi-
fication costs when dealing with users’ input noise for
expert systems. The present study fills this void and
makes two important contributions. First, we differen-
tiate between liars and truth-tellers in all methods pro-
posed in this study. By comparing the reported value
and the verified true value of a selected attribute, we
are able to calculate the probability that a user is a
liar, and the user may be treated differently based on
the calculated probability. The first two methods we
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propose are accuracy-based and termed split tree (ST)
and consolidated tree (CT), respectively. The difference
between them is that ST includes one tree branch for
liars and another for truth-tellers, while CT uses a
single tree for all users. Both ST and CT deliver bet-
ter accuracy than other benchmark methods, with CT
being the more superior method.
As the second major contribution, we propose two
value-based methods that minimize the total misclas-
sification cost. The first value-based method extends
ST, therefore it is termed value-based split tree (VST).
The second method extends CT and hence is named
value-based consolidated tree (VCT). Both VST and VCT
outperform benchmark methods in minimizing the
misclassification cost, with a slight edge belonging
to VCT.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the two accuracy-based methods in Section 2
and the two value-based methods in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we report on the experiments for performance
evaluation. In Section 5, we address some practical
issues in the selection of attributes for verification.
In Section 6, we extend the proposed methods to
cope with a more heterogeneous user population with
multiple groups. Section 7 discusses the applicability
and the practical guidelines of the proposed methods.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8 with discus-
sions on managerial implications and a future research
direction.
2. Accuracy-Based Methods
To differentiate it from decision trees generated from
other methods, we refer to the decision tree built
directly from expert-provided decision rules as the true
tree (TT). When decision rules are formulated, it is
implicitly assumed that all attribute values provided
by users are accurate. For instance, a decision rule may
classify a customerwho claims to havemedium income
and full-time employment as low-risk. An implicit
assumption behind this decision rule is that the cus-
tomer indeed has a medium income and a full-time
job. However, as discussed earlier, users may lie when
Figure 1. True Table and True Tree for Credit Risk Assessment
(b) True Tree
MR
Income
High
LR
Medium
Employed
Yes No
Bachelor’s
degree 
Yes No
LR
 
MR
Low
Bankruptcy 
Yes No
MRHR
Attributes
Rules
R0  
R1  
R2  
R3  
R4  
R5  
 
 
 
 
 
Income
H
M
M
M
L
L 
Bachelor’s
degree 
— 
Y 
— 
N 
— 
—
Employment
—
Y 
N 
Y 
—
-—
M
M
M
Classification 
LR
LR
R
R
HR
R
(a) Decision table
— 
—
—
— 
Y 
N 
Bankruptcy
providing inputs to a rule-based expert system. If a
customer who claims to have a medium income and
a full-time job is actually unemployed with no stable
income, then classifying the customer as low-risk can
lead to financial losses. As previously mentioned, fac-
ing such lying behavior, a KM tree, built based on the
KMmethod proposed by Jiang et al. (2005), can replace
the TT to serve as the “expert” at the time of con-
sultation. The KM Tree, however, does not differenti-
ate liars from truth-tellers, and hence leaves room for
improvement.
In this section, we propose two accuracy-based
methods, termed split tree (ST) and consolidated tree
(CT), that differentiate liars from truth-tellers. To illus-
trate these methods, we first present a credit risk
assessment example similar to the one used by Jiang
et al. (2005).
2.1. A Credit Risk Assessment Example
In order to decide whether to provide credit to poten-
tial customers, firms need to first assess their credit-
worthiness. From reliable historical data or their own
experience, human experts could derive a set of deci-
sion rules that, as illustrated in Figure 1(a), can be used
for such an assessment. According to rules represented
in this figure, a customer can be classified into three
risk levels, i.e., low risk (LR), medium risk (MR), and
high risk (HR), based on the values of four attributes:
income (high, medium, low), bachelor’s degree (yes, no),
employment (yes, no), and bankruptcy (yes, no). The dash
entry (“-”) in the figure means that the value of that
attribute “does not matter” in a given decision rule.
For instance, rule R0 classifies a customer as low-risk
as long as the customer’s income is high, regardless
of whether the customer has a bachelor’s degree, a
bankruptcy record, or a job. The decision rules shown
in Figure 1(a) are derived based on the assumption that
all attribute values are accurate, hence they represent
the true table. Based on heuristic algorithms, the True
Table can be translated into a true tree, as shown in
Figure 1(b). At the time of consultation, the true tree,
instead of the true table, should be used because the
former is more efficient than the latter.
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2.2. Probability of Being a Liar
All methods proposed in this study require the proba-
bility that a user is a liar be estimated. For the purpose
of probability estimation, it is necessary to verify the
value reported by the user for at least one attribute.
We call such an attribute verifiable attribute (or VA). In
the credit risk assessment example, bankruptcy could
be used as a VA since its value can be relatively cost-
efficiently obtained from a customer’s credit report.
Given both the reported and true values of a VA,
denoted by VAR and VAT respectively, the conditional
probability that the user is a liar can be derived based
on Bayes’ Theorem:
P(liar |VAR , VAT)
 (P(VAR , VAT | liar) ·P(liar))
·(P(VAR ,VAT | liar)P(liar)
+P(VAR , VAT | truth-teller) ·P(truth-teller))−1 , (1)
where
P(VAR ,VAT | liar) P(VAR | VAT , liar) ·P(VAT , liar),
and
P(VAR ,VAT | truth-teller) P(VAR | VAT , truth-teller)
·P(VAT , truth-teller).
Given (1), we have
P(truth-teller | VAR , VAT) 1−P(liar | VAR , VAT).
(2)
The conditional and marginal probabilities in (1) can
be obtained from historical data or through sampling.
During the sampling process, a certain number of users
are selected and their true attribute values are verified.
Users who lied about at least one attribute are classi-
fied as liars; those who did not lie about any attribute
are classified as truth-tellers. Based on this classifica-
tion, we can estimate the distribution of liars and truth-
tellers in the population, as illustrated in Figure 2. In
addition, we can estimate the distortion matrixes for liars
and truth-tellers for each attribute, as shown in Fig-
ures 3(a) and 3(b). We then calculate the distortion
matrices for the entire user population (including both
truth-tellers and liars) for all attributes, as shown in
Figure 3(c). In a distortion matrix, the rows represent
the true values, the columns represent the reported
values, and the numbers capture the conditional prob-
ability of every reported attribute value given each true
value. For instance, the first 0.3 in the liar’s distortion
matrix for income implies that among those whose true
Figure 2. Distribution of Liar and Truth-Teller
Liar (L) 0.4
Truth-teller (T) 0.6
income is low, 30% claimed that their incomewas high.
Through sampling, we can also estimate the marginal
distribution of true attribute values for both liars and
truth-tellers, as shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). The
marginal distributions for the entire user population
are calculated and shown in Figure 4(c). Note that these
distortion matrices and marginal distributions are sim-
ilar to those in Jiang et al. (2005). However, the prior
study does not estimate them separately for liars and
truth-tellers, but instead uses the population parame-
ter values as shown in Figures 3(c) and 4(c).
Based on the distributions and the conditional prob-
abilities summarized in the distortion matrices, we can
estimate the probability that a user is a liar given the
true and reported values of the VA. To illustrate, consider
a reported vector (IR  “H,′′DR  “N,′′ER  “N,′′ BR 
“N′′), representing the reported values of income, bach-
elor’s degree, employment, and bankruptcy, and a verified
true VA (bankruptcy) value BT  “N.′′ Using values
shown in Figures 2, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and Equation (1), we
obtain:
P(BR “N,′′ BT “N′′ | liar)
P(BR “N′′ | BT “N,′′ liar) ·P(BT “N,′′ liar)
0.90 ·0.55,
P(BR “N,′′ BT “N′′ | truth-teller)
P(BR “N′′ | BT “N,′′ truth-teller)
·P(BT “N,′′ truth-teller)1.0 ∗0.97.
Hence, P(liar | BR  “N,′′ BT  “N′′)
 (P(BR “N,′′ BT “N′′ | liar) ·P(liar))
· (P(BR “N,′′ BT “N′′ | liar) ·P(liar)
+P(BR “N,′′ BT “N′′ | truth-teller) ·P(truth-teller))−1

0.90 ·0.55 ·0.4
0.90 ·0.55 ·0.4+1.0 ·0.97 ·0.6 0.254.
This result shows that even if both BR and BT are
“N,” the user still has a 25.4% chance of being a liar.
This has an important implication. Even though the
reported value is the same as the true one, it does
not guarantee that the customer is a truth-teller. Con-
versely, we are certain that a user is a liar if the reported
value is different from the true one. This can be derived
based on (1): If BR is not equal to BT , P(BR | BT ,
truth-teller) 0, hence P(liar | BR , BT) 1.
2.3. Split Tree Method (ST)
The split tree (ST) method uses a True Tree and a tree
specifically built for liars, named liar tree, to generate
recommendations. As illustrated in Figure 5, whether
the true tree or the liar tree is consulted depends on
whether the probability of being a liar is below or
above a threshold. For instance, if the threshold is set
to 0.5, the true tree should be consulted if the prob-
ability of a user being a liar is 0.254, as calculated
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Figure 3(a). Liars’ Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High Medium Low
High 0.85 0.075 0.075
Medium 0.225 0.55 0.225
Low 0.3 0.3 0.4
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes No
Yes  0.9 0.1
No  0.4 0.6 
Employed (E )
Yes No
Yes 0.85 0.15 
No 0.90 0.10 
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes No 
Yes 0.11 0.89
No 0.10 0.90
Figure 3(b). Truth-Tellers’ Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High Medium Low
 
High 1.0 0.0 0.0
Medium 0.0 1.0 0.0
Low 0.0 0.0 1.0  
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes  No  
Yes 1.0 0.0
No  0.0 1.0
Employed (E )
Yes No
Yes 1.0 0.0
No 0.0 1.0
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes No  
Yes 1.0 0.0
No 0.0 1.0
Figure 3(c). The Entire Population’s Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High Medium Low
High 0.95 0.025 0.025  
Medium 0.09 0.82 0.09
Low 0.245 0.245 0.51
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes No
Yes 0.97 0.03
No 0.2 0.8
Employed (E )
Yes No
Yes 0.94  0.06
No 0.42 0.58
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes No
Yes 0.2 0.8  
No 0.03  0.97
Figure 4(a). Liars’ Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High 0.5
Medium 0.3
Low 0.2
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes 0.55
No 0.45
Employed (E )
Yes 0.65
No 0.35
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes 0.45
No 0.55
Figure 4(b). Truth-Tellers’ Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High 0.67
Medium 0.3
Low 0.03
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes 0.7
No 0.3
Employed (E )
Yes 0.73
No 0.27
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes 0.03
No 0.97
Figure 4(c). The Entire Population’s Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute
Income (I )
High 0.6
Medium 0.3
Low 0.1
Bachelor ’s degree (D )
Yes 0.64
No 0.36
Employed (E )
Yes 0.7
No 0.3
Bankruptcy (B )
Yes 0.2
No 0.8
in the preceding example. Conversely, the liar tree is
consulted if the probability is higher than 0.5. Under
the ST method, the true tree is directly constructed
from the expert-provided decision rules; the construc-
tion of a liar tree is similar to that of a KM tree (Jiang
et al. 2005), with the exception that the liar’s distortion
matrices and marginal distributions, instead of those
for all users, are used.We next briefly describe the steps
of building the liar tree.
We first construct the liar’s decision table (or liar
table), which includes recommendations for all possi-
ble reported vectors. For instance, for the credit risk
assessment example, there are 3×2×2×2 24 rules in
the liar table. Similarly, if there are 10 binary attributes,
the fully enumerated liar table will include 210 rules.
The recommendation for each possible reported vector
is computed using the following steps:
Step 1. Given a reported vector, calculate the probabili-
ties associated with every possible true vector: Denote the
reported and a true vector by Reported and True,
respectively. The conditional probability is
P(True |Reported) P(Reported |True)∗P(True)∑
rP(Reported |Truer)∗P(Truer) ,
(3)
where r is the index over all true vectors. If the num-
ber of possible true vectors is large, we can assume
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Figure 5. Split Tree Structure
P(liar |VAR, VAT)
≥Threshold<Threshold
True Tree Liar Tree
P(True)∏i P(Truei), where Truei represents the value
of attribute i in the True vector. Similar to the well-
known naïve Bayes method, we adopt two other
assumptions:
P(Reported | True) ∏
i
P(Reportedi | True)
for all i , and
P(Reportedi | True) 
∏
i
P(Reportedi | Truei) for all i.
Then,
P(Reported | True)∏
i
P(Reportedi | Truei). (4)
Note that in calculating the conditional probabilities,
we need to use the distortion matrices and marginal
distributions for liars, as illustrated in Figures 3(a)
and 4(a), respectively.
Step 2. Find the Liar Table recommendation: For every
possible true vector, use the True Tree to obtain the
recommendation. Add the conditional probabilities
associated with all true vectors that have the same rec-
ommendation. The recommendation with the highest
Figure 6. Complete Split Tree
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total probability is selected as the liar table recommen-
dation for the Reported vector, because this recom-
mendation is most likely to be the accurate one for a
user with the Reported vector.
Step 3. Generate and Condense the Liar Table: Repeat
Steps 1 and 2 for all possible reported vectors to gen-
erate the fully enumerated Liar Table. In the full Liar
Table, sometimes the value of a given attribute does not
affect the recommendation. Therefore, we can collapse
each set of “redundant” decision rules into a single
row, similar to those shown in Figure 1(a). Once all
such redundancies are removed, we obtain a condensed
liar table.
Step 4. Build the Liar Tree from the condensed Liar Table:
The heuristic used to build the True Tree can be used
to construct the liar tree (or LT for short).
Using data shown in Figures 2, 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c),
and following Steps 1–4, we obtain a Liar Tree for the
credit risk assessment example. The completed split
tree is shown in Figure 6. For better clarity, the true tree
structure is not included in the figure.
2.4. Consolidated Tree Method (CT)
With the ST method, the VA is always verified before
we can decide which tree branch to traverse. After
additional analysis, we find that under certain sce-
narios, the true value of the VA does not affect the
recommendation. Motivated by this observation, we
develop an alternativemethod to dealwith users’ input
distortion, under which the true value of the VA is
simply treated as a separate attribute in the decision
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table. Then, each vector in the expanded decision table
includes the reported values of all attributes as well as
the true value of the VA. The recommendation for this
vector is the one with the highest probability of being
correct given the available information. The expanded
decision table is then condensed and transformed into
a single tree. We call this method consolidated tree (or
CT) method because, unlike ST, there are no sepa-
rate tree branches for liars and truth-tellers. We next
describe the CT method in detail.
For each expanded vector that includes the reported
attribute values as well as the true value of the
VA, repeat Steps 1–4 to obtain the corresponding CT
recommendation.
Step 1. Find the probability that the user with the given
vector is a liar: Since the given vector includes both the
reported value and the true value of the VA, the prob-
ability that the user is a liar or a truth-teller can be
calculated based on formulas (1) and (2). We denote
these probabilities by P(liar | VAR ,VAT) and P(truth-
teller | VAR ,VAT), respectively.
Step 2. Calculate LT path probability associated with each
possible recommendation: The CT method considers the
probability that a user is a liar as well as the probability
that she is a truth-teller. If the user is a liar, then similar
to Step 1 in building the liar tree, we calculate the con-
ditional probabilities associated with all possible true
vectors and then sum up the conditional probabilities
of all true vectors that have the same recommendation.
Using the credit risk assessment example, we denote
the total conditional probabilities associated with low-,
medium-, and high-risk by P(LR), P(MR), and P(HR),
Figure 7. Consolidated Tree
Yes
Bankruptcy truth
Income
Employed Bankruptcy
Bachelor’s degree 
Yes Yes
Yes
yes
No No
No
No
MR
LR
HR 
MR
HR
MRLR
Bachelor’s degree
Yes No
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Yes No
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Yes No
Bachelor’s degree
MR
Bankruptcy truth
No
MR
Yes
LR
Employed
Yes No
Employed
Yes No
Bankruptcy truth
Yes No
LRMR
respectively. Since these probabilities are relevant only
if the user is a liar, we multiply each of them by P(liar |
VAR ,VAT) and obtain P(liar |VAR ,VAT) ·P(LR) , P(liar
| VAR ,VAT) · P(MR), and P(liar | VAR ,VAT) · P(HR).
Each of these probabilities is referred to as LT path prob-
ability associated with a recommendation.
Step 3. Calculate the TT path probability: If P(truth-
teller | VAR ,VAT) > 0, feed the reported values into
the True Tree, and obtain the true recommendation. Since
there is no uncertainty in the truth tree path, we set the
TT path probability associated with the true recommen-
dation as P(truth-teller |VAR ,VAT) and that associated
with all other recommendations as zero.
Step 4. Obtain the CT recommendation for the given vec-
tor: Add the LT and TT path probabilities for the same
recommendation. The recommendation with the high-
est probability sum is selected as the CT recommen-
dation for the given vector. For instance, if the True
recommendation is MR in the credit risk assessment
example, thenwe compare P(liar |VAR ,VAT) ·P(MR)+
P(truth-teller | VAR ,VAT) with P(liar | VAR ,VAT) ·
P(LR) and P(liar | VAR ,VAT) · P(HR). The recommen-
dation with the highest probability is selected as the
CT recommendation.
Step 5. Repeat Steps 1–4 for all possible vectors to gener-
ate the fully enumerated CT table.
Step 6. Condense the CT table and transform it into a
CT tree.
Following Steps 1–6, we construct a consolidated tree
for the credit assessment example as shown in Fig-
ure 7. Note that “bankruptcy truth” is treated as the
fifth attribute in the tree. Comparing it with the split
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tree shown in Figure 6, we find that these two trees
do not always lead to the same recommendation. Fur-
thermore, Figure 7 shows that a user’s true bankruptcy
value does not need to be verified in every branch.
This can lead to significant cost savings because verify-
ing the true value of a VA takes time and incurs costs.
Therefore, the CT method is more efficient than the ST
method.
3. Value-Based Methods
The ST and CT methods attempt to maximize the
accuracy of recommendations. An implicit assumption
made in the two methods is that the misclassification
cost remains the same for all misclassification scenar-
ios. In reality, this may not be the case. For instance,
incorrectly classifying a low-risk customer as a high-
risk one may lead to the denial of loan and hence the
loss of opportunity to earn interest from the customer.
On the other hand, misclassifying a high-risk customer
as a low-risk one may lead to default, a potentially
much more costly outcome. In this section, we extend
the two accuracy-based methods to the correspond-
ing value-based methods: Value-based split tree (VST)
and value-based consolidated tree (VCT). The main differ-
ence between the accuracy-based and the value-based
methods is that the former maximizes the accuracy of
recommendations, while the latter minimizes the mis-
classification costs.
To use the value-based methods, we need to know
the misclassification costs under different scenarios,
which can be summarized in a misclassification cost
matrix. Figure 8 shows a hypothetical matrix for the
credit risk assessment example. The columns rep-
resent the true class, and the rows represent the
recommended class. In real-world settings, misclassi-
fication costs can be estimated by domain experts or
from historical data. For instance, financial institutions
often collect data regarding loan default rates from cus-
tomers at different risk levels.1 Such data could be used
to construct the misclassification cost matrix.
3.1. Value-Based Split Tree Method (VST)
The input of VST is similar to that of the ST method,
except that VST takes into consideration the misclassi-
fication costs when deciding the best recommendation.
Specifically, the method traverses the true tree branch
when the probability of a liar is below a threshold.
Otherwise, it traverses the value-based liar tree branch.
Figure 8. Misclassification Cost Matrix
LR MR HR 
LR 0 10 20
MR 45 0 28
HR 100 50 0
Regarding the construction procedure, the value-based
liar tree and liar tree differ only in Step 2 that gen-
erates the (value-based) liar table recommendations.
In Step 2 of the value-based liar tree construction, we
first sum up the probabilities of all possible true vec-
tors with the same recommendation, then calculate the
misclassification costs under different scenarios, and
finally select the recommendation that minimizes the
total misclassification cost instead of the one with the
highest probability.
Formally, let GR denote the generated recommenda-
tion and AR the accurate recommendation. The recom-
mendationwith the lowest misclassification cost can be
obtained by
argmin
GRq
∑
l
C(GRq | ARl) ·P(ARl), (5)
where l is the index over all possible accurate recom-
mendations, q is the index over all possible generated
recommendations, P(ARl) is the same probability for
ARl as that obtained in Step 2 of the ST method, and
C(GRq | ARl) is the misclassification cost and can be
found from the misclassification cost matrix.
Figure 9 shows the value-based split tree for the
credit risk assessment example. Similar to ST, VST pro-
duces a tree structure that includes a True Tree branch
and a valued-based liar tree branch. Once again, the
branch traversed at the time of consultation depends
on whether the probability of a user being a liar is
above or below the given threshold.
3.2. Value-Based Consolidated
Tree Method (VCT)
Analogous to the extension from ST to VST, we now
extend the accuracy-based CT method to produce a
value-based consolidated tree (VCT) that minimizes the
expected total misclassification cost. Similar to the dif-
ference between ST and VST, the procedures for CT
and VCT differ only in the step that selects the CT
(VCT) recommendations. Specifically, in Step 4 of the
VCT method, once the sum of the LT and TT path
probabilities associated with every recommendation
are obtained, we use formula (5) to obtain the expected
total misclassification cost C(GRq) associated with each
recommendation GRq , and then select the recommen-
dationwith the lowest total misclassification cost as the
VCT recommendation. Figure 10 illustrates the VCT for
the credit risk assessment example. Again, VST always
requires the verification of the true value of the VA,
whereas VCT needs it only for some tree branches.
Furthermore, the differences between Figures 6 and 9
or those between Figures 7 and 10 show that the
most accurate recommendation is not always the one
that minimizes themisclassification cost, implying that
pursuing a higher accuracy does not always lead to a
lower cost. This confirms that the value-basedmethods
are indeed necessary, especially when the misclassifi-
cation costs demonstrate a high level of asymmetry.
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Figure 9. Value-Based Split Tree
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Figure 10. Value-Based Consolidated Tree
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4. Experiments for Performance
Evaluation
We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the per-
formances of the proposed methods against existing
methods. The first set of experiments use a payment
default risk data set provided by a telecom service
company in China. The data set contains 6,783 cus-
tomer service/default risk records and is used to
assess the default risk level of a customer, i.e., either
low risk (LR) or high risk (HR). The data set con-
tains eight predictor attributes: residence status (vil-
lage/city), customer type (family/individual), identity
type (business license/ID card), service status (active/
inactive/suspend), credit score (low/medium/high),
and intended payment method (buyout/cash/withhold/
collection) are categorical attributes, and age and ser-
vice duration (i.e., the continuous time duration of the
current service) are numerical attributes. We adopt
the discretization algorithm developed by Fayyad and
Irani (1993) to discretize the two continuous attributes,
as it was used in a previous credit-risk analysis study
(Baesens et al. 2003). Specifically, age is assigned a
value of “younger” if a customer’s age is ≤40, and
“elder” otherwise. Similarly, service duration takes a
value of “short” if the duration of service is ≤4 years,
and “long” otherwise. Because this data set is highly
Figure 11. True Tree for Telecom Payment Default Risk Assessment
High
Low
Younger
Customer
type 
Suspend
Credit score
Service status
Identity type 
Village
Active
Cash
Buyout 
City 
HR 
HR
HR 
LR
Business license
LR
IndividualFamily
ID card 
CollectionWithhold
Intended
payment method
LR
Cash
LRHR LR
Age
Long
Intended
payment method
Buyout
Service
duration
Withhold
Elder
HR
Inactive
Short
HR
HR
LR
Residence status
Collection
Service
duration
HR 
Long Short
LR HR
Credit score
Customer
type
LR
IndividualFamily
HR
LR HR
Low
Medium High
Medium
reliable, we treat the tree generated from the data set,
as shown in Figure 11, as the true tree in our subse-
quent experiments.
4.1. Experiment Procedure
We first describe the basic experiment procedure for
a fixed True Tree and a fixed set of parameter values,
followed by the extended procedure that varies some
of the parameter values.
4.1.1. The Basic Procedure. The experiment proce-
dure for a given true tree is as follows:
Step 1. Obtain the underlying parameter values: We first
generate the true parameters for the underlying user
population, including the percentage of liars, the liars’
distortion matrices, and the marginal distributions of
the attributes for liars and truth-tellers. We then gener-
ate a random sample of users based on these parameter
values. The sample of users is subsequently used to
obtain the estimated distributions and distortionmatri-
ces. In this step, we also simulate a misclassification
cost matrix and the values in the matrix are again ran-
domly generated.
Step 2. Generate KM Tree: The KM tree is constructed
for comparison with the methods proposed in the
present study. Since the KM method does not differ-
entiate liars from truth-tellers, we construct the KM
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
29
.18
6.1
76
.12
2]
 on
 02
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7, 
at 
07
:54
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Cai, Jiang, and Mookerjee: How to Deal with Liars
278 INFORMS Journal on Computing, 2017, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 268–286, ©2017 INFORMS
tree using the marginal distributions and distortion
matrixes for the entire population, similar to those
illustrated in Figures 3(c) and 4(c).
Step 3. Generate ST, CT, VST, and VCT Trees: Select
an attribute as the verifiable attribute (VA). Follow the
steps described in Sections 2 and 3 to build the ST, CT,
VST, and VCT trees.
Step 4. Simulate User’s True and Reported Input Vectors:
Based on the marginal distribution of each attribute,
we randomly generate a true input vector for each
simulated user. This input vector is then fed into the
True Tree to obtain the true recommendation, which is
used to decide the accuracy of other recommendations.
Then, based on the percentage of liars in the popula-
tion, we randomly determine whether the user is a liar
or not. If the user is determined to be a truth-teller, her
reported input vector is the same as her true input vec-
tor. In case the user is a liar, her reported input values
are distorted based on the assumed distortion matrices
for liars.
Step 5. Calculate Accuracy and Misclassification Cost:
Feed each user’s reported input vector into the true
tree, KM tree, ST tree, CT tree, VST tree, and VCT tree
to obtain their respective recommendations. Compare
the recommendation obtained by each method with
the true one. If they are the same, the recommendation
is considered correct; otherwise it is incorrect. For each
incorrect recommendation, the corresponding misclas-
sification cost is calculated based on the simulatedmis-
classification cost matrix.
Step 6. Compare Accuracy and Misclassification Cost:
Repeat Steps 4 and 5 10,000 times to simulate 10,000
users. Record the total number of correct recommen-
dations and the total misclassification cost associated
with each method. Compare the accuracies, i.e., the
percentages of correct recommendations, and the mis-
classification costs of different methods.
4.1.2. The Extended Procedure. The basic experiment
procedure uses a fixed set of population parameter
values, including the liar percentage and distortion
matrices. To evaluate the performance of the different
methods under varying severity of lying, we control
two important parameters, i.e., liar percentage and dis-
tortion level for liars in an additional set of experiment
runs. The distortion level for an attribute measures the
probability that the attribute’s value will be distorted
by liars, and is calculated based on the marginal dis-
tribution and distortion matrix for liars. The distor-
tion levels are kept the same for all attributes in our
experiments.
In these experiment runs, we try 11 different liar per-
centages varying from 0% to 100% and nine different
levels of distortion from 0.1 to 0.9. In addition, we ran-
domly choose one attribute as the verifiable attribute
(VA) during the extended procedure. For a given com-
bination of liar percentage and distortion level, we per-
form the basic procedure shown in Section 4.1.1 to
compare the performances of the different methods.
4.2. Results
We run the extended procedure based on the true
tree built for the telecom payment default risk exam-
ple, as shown in Figure 11. Based on the data col-
lected from the experiments, we calculate the average
accuracy and the total misclassification cost of each
method, as summarized in Table 1. We can see that the
CT method achieves an average accuracy of 84.18%,
the highest among all compared methods. ST ranks
second, followed by TT , VCT, KM, and VST. Com-
pared with TT and KM, CT improves the accuracy
by 4.91% and 5.31%, respectively. Regarding the mis-
classification cost, VCT achieves the lowest total cost
at $51,395 for 10,000 simulated users. VST ranks sec-
ond, and then CT, ST, TT, and KM. Compared with TT
and KM, VCT delivers a per-user cost saving of $2.52
and $2.79, respectively. The results show that proposed
methods can lead to substantial financial benefits for
organizations.
To better understand how the performances of the
methods are affected by the severity of users’ lying
behaviors, we plot their performances against two con-
trolled parameters, i.e., the liar percentage and the dis-
tortion level.
4.2.1. Liar Percentage. Figures 12(a) and 12(b) show
the impact of liar percentage on accuracy under two
distortion levels (50% and 70%). We find that CT
always performs better than ST, KM, TT, VCT, and VST,
and ST is the second best in most cases. In both figures,
when the liar percentage is low, the performance dif-
ferences among the different methods are small. Their
performance differences start to widen as the liar per-
centage increases. As the liar percentage approaches
100%, however, the performance differences between
CT, ST, and KM again become narrower. When the liar
percentage is 100%, the three methods have exactly
the same accuracy. This is because both ST and CT
rely completely on the liar tree, which is the same
as KM tree under this condition. Similarly, VCT and
VST achieve the same accuracy when liar percentage is
100% because they both provide the same recommen-
dations as those from the value-based liar tree.
A surprising result observed from the two figures is
that the True Tree can outperform the KM tree when
Table 1. Overall Performance Comparison
Method TT KM ST CT VST VCT
Accuracy (%) 79.27 78.87 83.31 84.18 78.22 78.70
Misclassification cost 76,609 79,271 69,820 66,338 53,589 51,395
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Figure 12. (Color online) Impact of Liar Percentage on Accuracy
(a) Distortion level fixed at 0.5 (b) Distortion level fixed at 0.7
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the liar percentage is not very high. The advantage of
true tree over KM is more significant when distortion
level is between 30% and 70% (more visible in Fig-
ure 12(b)). This is a result not observed in the study
that develops the KM method (Jiang et al. 2005). We
will further examine this interesting phenomenon in
Section 4.3.
Figures 13(a) and 13(b) show the impact of liar per-
centage on the total misclassification cost at two distor-
tion levels (0.5 and 0.7, respectively). We can see that
the value-based methods lead to significantly lower
misclassification costs than do other methods. Between
the two value-based methods, VCT always performs
better than, or as well as, VST. The difference is smaller
when the liar percentage is close to 100% or 0%.
Regarding the other methods, we find that the cost-
based performance ordering closely follows the accu-
racy ordering. For instance, CT has a relatively lower
misclassification cost compared to ST, KM, and TT, and
KM can lead to a higher misclassification cost than TT
unless the liar percentage is very high. In both cases,
the lower (higher) misclassification cost is the result of
a higher (lower) accuracy of recommendations.
Figure 13. (Color online) Impact of Liar Percentage on Misclassification Cost
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
M
is
cl
as
sf
ica
tio
n 
co
st
0
40,000
80,000
120,000
160,000
M
is
cl
as
sf
ica
tio
n 
co
st
TT KM
ST CT
VST VCT
(a) Distortion level fixed at 0.5 (b) Distortion level fixed at 0.7
Liar percentage (%)
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Liar percentage (%)
4.2.2. Distortion Level. We next examine the impact
of input distortion on the performances of the differ-
ent methods. Figures 14(a) and 14(b) show its impact
on accuracy under two liar percentages (50% and 70%,
respectively). We can see that CT still performs best
among all compared methods. When distortion level is
very low (e.g., 0.1) or very high (e.g., 0.9), the perfor-
mance difference between CT and ST narrows. We also
see in Figure 14(a) that the TT has a clear advantage
over KM. At a higher distortion level, KM may lead to
a worse accuracy than all other methods.
Further, by comparing Figure 14 with Figure 12, we
observe that the accuracies of the four methods pro-
posed in this research (i.e., CT, ST, VCT, and VST) gen-
erally decrease with the liar percentage, while they
first decrease and then increase as the distortion level
changes from very low (e.g., 0.1) to very high (e.g.,
0.9). This is because when the distortion level is close
to 1.0, there is less certainty about the true attribute
values. For instance, given a binary attribute with a
distortion level of 0.9, just choosing the value oppo-
site to the reported one can lead to a 90% accuracy.
The four proposed methods are sufficiently intelligent
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Figure 14. (Color online) Impact of Distortion Level on Accuracy
(a) Liar percentage fixed at 50% (b) Liar percentage fixed at 70%
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to incorporate this factor, hence their accuracies can
improve as the distortion level approaches 1.0.
The impact of the distortion level on the misclassi-
fication costs of the compared methods is shown in
Figures 15(a) and 15(b), corresponding to two fixed
liar percentages at 50% and 70%, respectively. Again,
VCT always has the lowest misclassification cost and
VST ranks second. The misclassification costs of the
accuracy-based methods again correlate with the accu-
racies of their recommendations, with CT consistently
performing better than ST. The KM method performs
the worst when the distortion level is high.
4.3. Why TT May Outperform KM
As pointed out in Section 4.2, KM is frequently out-
performed by the True Tree (TT), a result contrasting
the finding by Jiang et al. (2005), which shows that KM
consistently outperforms the true tree. To understand
why KM sometimes may perform worse than TT, we
need to examine the composition of the user popu-
lation that includes both liars and truth-tellers. Note
that KM does not differentiate liars from truth-tellers.
Instead, the KMmethod assumes that all users may lie
and the probability of lying about each attribute is the
same across users.
Figure 15. (Color online) Impact of Distortion Level on Misclassification Cost
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In reality, there are users who tend to lie and users
who rarely or never lie. The two groups of users in a
population are illustrated in Figure 16. The first group
accounts for 20% of the population, and they lie 100%
of the time. The second group accounts for 80% of the
population, and all of them are truth-tellers. When the
two groups are mixed together, the liar percentage for
the entire population is 20%. If the True Tree is adopted
for this particular population, although the recommen-
dations for the liars may have a low accuracy, the rec-
ommendations for all truth-tellers are guaranteed to
be correct. Because the truth-tellers account for 80%
of the population, the average accuracy for true tree
will be at least 80%. On the other hand, when the KM
tree is adopted, since it assumes that everyone is a liar,
the recommendations for truth-tellers may not be cor-
rect. Even the recommendations for liars may not have
a high accuracy rate because the distortion matrices
used by the KM, which are calculated for the entire
population, are very different from those for the liars.
As a result, the accuracy of KM may suffer. Therefore,
the true tree can outperform the KM tree under this
scenario.
Based on the user composition illustrated in Fig-
ure 16, we can imagine that when the liar percentage is
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Figure 16. (Color online) Mixing Liars and Truth-Tellers
Mixed80% Truth-tellers20% liars
high, the distortion matrices for the entire population,
which are used by KM, will become similar to those for
liars. Then, the performance of KM should improve.
This is confirmed by Figure 12, which shows that when
the liar percentage is above 70%, the KM tree clearly
outperforms the true tree. It even matches CT when
the liar percentage is close to 100%.
From the experiment results and the above analy-
sis, we conclude that the KMmethod is recommended
only if the user population is relatively homogeneous
and the majority of them tend to lie. When liars only
account for a relatively small percentage of the popula-
tion, the methods proposed in this study, CT and VCT
in particular, should be used.
4.4. Robustness Tests
Additional simulated experiments are conducted to
evaluate the robustness of the proposed methods
under various conditions.
4.4.1. Tests on Different VAs. We run additional tests
to assess whether the selection of VAs affects the per-
formances of the proposed methods. With a fixed true
tree, we change the VA in each run. We find that there
is no significant change in performances as the selected
VA changes, and the findings presented in Section 4.2
remain qualitatively valid.
4.4.2. Tests on Multiple VAs. An intuitive extension of
the proposedmethods is to utilize multiple VAs to esti-
mate the probability of a user being a liar. In additional
experiments, we try two and three VAs for the ST and
CT methods. For expositional convenience, we label
the Double-VA extensions of ST and CT by DST and
DST, and their Triple-VA extensions by TST and TCT,
respectively. The average accuracies for ST, CT, DST,
DCT, TST, and TCT are found to be 83.31%, 84.18%,
84.58%, 85.12%, 85.17%, and 85.52%, respectively. Fig-
ure 17 depicts how the performances of the different
methods change with the two controlled parameters.
It shows that including more VAs slightly increases the
accuracy, and the CT-based methods consistently out-
perform the ST-basedmethods. Our t-tests confirm that
the difference between ST-based and CT-based meth-
ods is significant regardless of the number of VAs used.
4.4.3. Tests on Distortion Matrices. We are also inter-
ested in evaluating whether the characteristics of the
distortion matrices affect the performances of the
compared methods. For this purpose, we adopt
the Kullback–Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler
1951) to measure the “amount” of difference between
two distortion matrices. The formula for this mea-
sure is
DKL(P‖Q)
∑
i
P(i) ln P(i)
Q(i) , (6)
where P, Q are two matrixes and DKL(P‖Q) is the K-L
divergence of Q from P. We select identity matrix P
as the benchmark matrix. For each distortion matrix,
we calculate its K-L divergence from the identity
matrix. Then we examine the relationships between
the K-L divergence of each distortion matrix and the
corresponding performance metrics, including both
accuracy and misclassification cost. The results do not
suggest a significant correlation between the Kullback–
Leibler divergence and the performances of the differ-
ent methods.
4.4.4. Additional Tests on Simulated Trees. We sim-
ulate another 100 True decision tables based on the
credit risk assessment example shown in Figure 1(a). In
each table, the recommendation corresponding to each
input vector is randomly generated. We also simulate
33 true decision tables for the telecom payment default
risk example by varying the marginal distributions of
the input vectors. The recommendation to each input
vector is the same as that from the True Tree shown
in Figure 11. For each of the simulated True Trees, we
reevaluate the performance of the different methods
by trying 11 liar percentages and nine distortion levels.
The results are found to be consistent with the findings
reported in Section 4.2.
4.4.5. Tests on Random Errors. The goal of this study
is to address users’ intentional input distortion. In real-
ity, however, incorrect input values could also result
from random errors. For instance, a male user, who
does not benefit from lying about his gender, could
accidently select “Female” from a drop-down list. As a
result, the proposed methods may incorrectly classify
him as a liar and produce an incorrect recommenda-
tion. Because it is typically impossible to separate ran-
dom errors from intentional lying, instead of extending
the methods to handle random errors, we are inter-
ested in evaluating the robustness of proposed meth-
ods in the presence of random errors.
With possible random errors considered, we again
conduct experiments based on both the credit risk
assessment and the telecom payment default risk
assessment examples. In these experiments, the pro-
cedures used to construct the ST, CT, VST, and VCT
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Figure 17. (Color online) Multiple Verified Attributes Affect Accuracy
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Ac
cu
ra
cy
(a) Liar percentage
ST CT
DST DCT
TST TCT
0.79
0.83
0.87
0.91
0 20 40 60
%
80 100 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
(b) Distortion level
trees remain unchanged. The difference lies in how the
“reported” attribute values for each simulated user are
generated. Specifically, given a simulated “true” vec-
tor, if the user is determined to be a liar, we generate
an intermediate vector based on the distortion matrices
for liars; if she is a truth-teller, the intermediate vector
is the “true” vector. We then add random errors to the
intermediate vector based on a separate set of random
error matrices to generate the “reported” vector.We vary
the percentage of users producing random errors from
0% to 10%. Because of the random errors, the aver-
age accuracies for TT, KM, ST, CT, VST, and VCT drop
slightly to 77.93%, 77.31%, 80.59%, 81.48%, 76.89%, and
77.64%, respectively. It is clear that CT and ST remain
the two top performers. Therefore, the presence of ran-
dom errors does not seem to affect the advantage of the
proposed methods in relation to benchmark methods.
Based on the prior robustness tests, we conclude that
the four proposed methods are superior to existing
methods. Among them, the consolidated tree methods
(i.e., CT and VCT) are better than the split tree methods
(i.e., ST and VST). Therefore, depending on whether
the goal is to maximize accuracy or minimize misclas-
sification cost, either CT or VCT should be the method
of choice in addressing the challenge of input distor-
tion for rule-based expert systems.
5. Selection of Verifiable Attributes
In this section, we discuss several practical issues re-
lated to the selection of verifiable attributes (VAs) to
support the four methods proposed in this study (i.e.,
ST, CT, VST, VCT).
5.1. Determining the Best VA(s)
Verifying the true values of a VA is not cost-free. Some
attributes are less costly to verify than others. For
instance, verifying a user’s bankruptcy status could be
much less costly than verifying her income. Therefore,
the attribute(s) that leads to the highest net benefit,
which equals the expected reduction in misclassifi-
cation cost minus the cost of verification, should be
selected as the VA(s) for the proposed methods.
The cost of verification for each selected VA(s) equals
the cost of one verification times the probability that
the VA(s) will need to be verified at the time of consul-
tation (recall that under CT or VCT, sometimes it is not
necessary to verify the true values of VAs). The proba-
bility can be obtained by summing up the probabilities
associated with all branches of a tree (e.g., a VCT tree)
that require the true values of the VA(s). In the credit
risk assessment example, suppose the cost of verifying
a user’s bankruptcy status is $20, and that of verifying
Education is $45. When bankruptcy is selected as the VA,
the probability that it needs to be verified in the VCT
tree is 0.35. When education is selected as the VA, the
probability that it has to be verified is 0.41. Then, the
expected costs of verification for the two attributes are,
respectively,
CV(Bankruptcy)  20 · 0.35 7.00 and
CV(Education)  45 · 0.41 18.45.
The misclassification cost associated with each se-
lected VA(s) can be assessed based on either simulated
or real performance evaluation. In either case, we need
to obtain a mis-recommendation matrix for each selected
VA(s), which summarizes the probabilities that objects
with a given true classification are misclassified into
other classifications. For instance, such a matrix can
record the percentages of “low risk” customers that
are misclassified as “high risk” and “medium risk”
by a proposed method. We can use such a mis-
recommendation matrix, along with the misclassifica-
tion cost matrix and the marginal distribution of true
classifications, to determine the expected cost of mis-
recommendations corresponding to each selected VA(s).
To illustrate, suppose the mis-recommendation
matrices corresponding to the two VA options are
shown in Figures 18(a) and 18(b), and the marginal
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
29
.18
6.1
76
.12
2]
 on
 02
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7, 
at 
07
:54
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Cai, Jiang, and Mookerjee: How to Deal with Liars
INFORMS Journal on Computing, 2017, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 268–286, ©2017 INFORMS 283
Figure 18(a). Mis-Recommendation Matrix Corresponding
to Bankruptcy
HR (%) MR (%) LR (%)
HR 85 14 1
MR 23 71 6
LR 39 18 43
Figure 18(b). Mis-Recommendation Matrix Corresponding
to Education
HR (%) MR (%)
 
LR (%)
HR 87 9 4
MR 22 73 5
LR 31 6 63
probabilities associated with “HR,” “MR,” and “LR,”
are 0.1, 0.3, 0.6, respectively. Using the values in Fig-
ures 18(a) and 18(b), the misrepresentation costs are
calculated as
CMR(Bankruptcy)
 (45 ·14%+100 ·1%) ·0.1+ (10 ·23%+50 ·6%) ·0.3
+ (20 ·39%+28 ·18%) ·0.610.024, and
CMR(Education)
 (45 ·9%+100 ·4%) ·0.1+ (10 ·22%+50 ·5%) ·0.3
+ (20 ·31%+28 ·6%) ·0.66.943.
Therefore, the total costs associated with the two VA
options are
CT(Bankruptcy)  CV(Bankruptcy)+CMR(Bankruptcy)
 17.024
and
CT(Education)  CV(Education)+CMR(Education)
 25.393.
Thus, bankruptcy is a better option than education as VA.
Similarly, the costs associated with other VA(s) can be
computed. The VA(s) with the lowest total cost should
be selected.
5.2. Selecting an External VA
In some cases, it may be difficult or costly to verify the
attributes included in the True Tree. As an alternative,
we could use an external attribute, which is not included
in the True Tree, to estimate the probability that a user
is a liar. For instance, in the credit risk assessment
example, a user’s Citizenship status (yes, no) is an exter-
nal attribute. To use it as a VA, we obtain its distortion
matrices and marginal distributions, as illustrated in
Figures 19(a) and 19(b). Once a user’s reported and true
VA values are known, we can calculate the probability
that a user is a liar.
Figure 19(a). Distortion Matrices for the External Verified
Attribute
Citizenship (C ) for liars
Yes No
Yes  0.39 0.61
No 0.17 0.83
Citizenship (C ) for truth-teller
Yes No
Yes 1.00 0.00
No 0.00 1.00
Figure 19(b). Marginal Distribution for the External Verified
Attribute
Citizenship (C ) for liars
Yes 0.52
No 0.48
Citizenship (C ) for truth-teller
Yes 0.6
No  0.4
Note that the structure of split trees is not much
affected by using an external or internal VA since the
VA is always first verified. For Consolidated Trees,
since the reported and true values for an external VA
are treated as two additional attributes in the decision
table, the tree structure changes. To illustrate, using
values shown in Figures 2, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 19(a), and
19(b), we obtain a consolidated tree for the credit risk
assessment example, as shown in Figure 20. Compared
to Figure 7, this tree contains more nodes and layers.
Note that in certain branches, we do not need to verify
the value of the external VA, which is consistent with
CT trees built using internals VAs.
With citizenship added as an external VA, we rebuild
the 100 simulated decision trees (for credit risk assess-
ment) described in the Section 4.4.4 and rerun the pre-
vious performance evaluations. We also reevaluate the
performances of the methods after adding an exter-
nal VA to the decision trees built from the telecom
payment default risk example. The results are consis-
tent between the two sets of experiments. Figure 21
shows how the performances of the compared meth-
ods change with the liar percentage and distortion
level for the telecompayment default risk example. The
average accuracies for TT, KM, ST, CT, VST, andVCT are
found to be 80.32%, 79.63%, 83.31%, 84.91%, 78.98%,
and 79.45%, respectively. The performance ordering is
consistent with those obtained when internal VAs are
used, which indicates that the adoption of external VAs
does not affect the effectiveness of the proposed meth-
ods. This fact provides us more options when selecting
the VAs for the proposed methods. It is even possi-
ble to adopt a combination of internal and external
attributes. These options can help lower the barrier for
implementing the proposed methods and potentially
reduce the verification cost.
5.3. Dealing with Strategic Agents
Once the proposed methods are deployed, it is possi-
ble that after repeated tries, a strategic agent can find
out which attribute is used as a VA. There are possible
countermeasures to deal with such a strategic behav-
ior. The first option is to change the VA from time to
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Figure 20. Consolidated Tree with External Verified Attribute
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Figure 21. (Color online) External Verified Attributes Affect Accuracy
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time. The second option is to randomize the selection
of VAs at runtime. We have built and tested such vari-
ation methods and found that the previous findings
regarding performance ordering remain valid.
6. Extension with Multiple User Groups
So far, the proposedmethods consider only two groups
of users, i.e., liars and truth-tellers. Under certain set-
tings, such a two-group classification may not be suf-
ficient to capture the heterogeneity of potential users.
For instance, in a given user population, some never
lie, some lie occasionally, while others lie frequently.
Users could also exhibit different levels of strategic
lying behaviors. For instance, some may only distort
the attributes that are more likely to affect the outcome,
while others may be more casual in attribute selec-
tion. Upon further examination, we conclude that as
long as the different groups of users can be identified
from a sample (possibly with the help of behavioral
experts or through deeper analysis of historical data),
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the proposed methods can be extended to deal with a
more heterogeneous user population. We next demon-
strate how this can be done using a three-group case
including frequent liars, occasional liars, and truth-
tellers.
Under the three-group case, we need to estimate the
probability of a user being a frequent liar and that of
a user being an occasional liar. Such probabilities can
again be calculated based on the Bayes’ theorem. The
difference from the two-group case is that we need to
have one more set of distortion matrices and marginal
distributions, which can be obtained based on data col-
lected from the three groups of users during sampling.
We first develop the accuracy-based three-group
methods. The Split Tree has three branches, i.e., fre-
quent liar tree (FLT), occasional liar tree (OLT), and true
tree. The construction of the FLT and OLT branches is
similar to that of the liar tree, with the exception that
the frequent and occasional liars’ distortion matrices
and marginal distributions are used, instead of those
for all liars. At the time of system consultation, the
branch with the highest probability for a given user
will be traversed. The construction of the three-group
consolidated tree is also similar to that of the two-
group one, with the exception that the three-group
method combines the FLT, OLT, and TT path probabil-
ities to determine the CT recommendation. Analogous
to the extension from the two-group accuracy-based
methods to the two-group value-based methods, we
also extend three-group accuracy-based methods to
the three-group value-based methods.
With the three-group methods developed, we rerun
the previous experiments based on the simulated deci-
sion trees for credit risk assessment and the decision
trees for telecom payment default risk assessment.
The results are again consistent with those obtained
from the experiments for the two-group methods. Fig-
ure 22 shows how the accuracy of the differentmethods
changes with the liar percentage and distortion level
for the telecom payment default risk example. We can
Figure 22. (Color online) Accuracy of Three-Group Methods
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see that CT and ST consistently rank the first and sec-
ond in terms of accuracy. In additional experiments,
we use nine different ratios (from 1 to 9) of the num-
ber of occasional liars to the number of frequent liars.
In each run, we randomly select one attribute in the
true tree as the VA. The average accuracies for TT, KM,
ST, CT, VST, and VCT are found to be 79.80%, 79.51%,
82.66%, 83.44%, 79.04%, and 79.26%, respectively. The
ordering of accuracy is exactly the same as that shown
in Table 1. We also evaluate the performance of the
three-group methods measured by the total misclassi-
fication cost. The results are again consistent with the
findings reported in Section 4.2 for the two-group case.
We thus conclude that the proposed methods remain
superior even if a more heterogeneous user population
is taken into account.
7. Practical Applications of the
Proposed Methods
Although we use credit risk assessment as the moti-
vating example of this study, the proposed methods
should be applicable in other domains as well, pro-
vided that the following conditions are met: (1) the
decision rules used to construct an expert system are
provided by experts or learned from reliable histor-
ical data, and the data fed into the expert systems
has much lower reliability than that assumed by the
system; (2) users providing inputs to the expert sys-
tem are heterogeneous in their propensity to lie about
the inputs; (3) each user group’s distortion matrices
andmarginal distributions can be separately estimated
from historical or sampling data; and (4) misclassifica-
tion costs are obtainable if the VCTmethod is adopted.
Note that the above conditions also summarize the
key data required in order to implement the proposed
methods.
Based on the theoretical analyses and experimental
results presented in the previous sections, we summa-
rize a few practical guidelines on the implementation
of the proposedmethods. First, ifmisclassification costs
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are asymmetric, the cost-minimizing VCT method is
preferable. In case such costs are approximately sym-
metric, then the accuracy-maximizing CT method is
a good alternative. Second, selecting the appropriate
VA(s) is themost critical step in a successful implemen-
tation of the proposedmethods. In general, the selected
VA(s) should maximize the net benefit, which equals
the expected reduction in misclassification cost minus
the cost of verification. The selectionofVA(s) shouldnot
be limited to a single VA, or only the internal VAs. In the
presence of strategic agents, randomizing the selection
of VAs in real time should be considered.
8. Conclusion
Despite the prevalence of input distortion by users of
rule-based expert systems, research on how to effec-
tively address such challenges has been limited. The
methods proposed in this study explicitly differenti-
ate liars from truth-tellers and treat them differently
when their information is fed into a redesigned rule-
based expert system. Two of the proposed methods
(i.e., split tree [ST] and consolidated tree [CT]) attempt
to improve the accuracy of recommendations, and the
other two (i.e., value-based split tree [VST] and value-
based consolidated tree [VCT]) aim to minimize the
expected misclassification cost resulting from incorrect
recommendations. Experimental results show that the
proposedmethods can lead to significantly better accu-
racy or lower cost than existing methods. Between the
two pairs of proposedmethods, we find that CT consis-
tently outperforms ST in improving the accuracy of rec-
ommendations, and VCT always performs better than
VST in reducing the expected misclassification cost.
The methodologies and findings of this study
have important financial implications. Although the
proposed methods require the verification of user-
provided attribute values, the cost of such validation
can be controlled by selecting the attributes that are
relatively easy to verify. As a result, we expect the
benefit of adopting the proposed methods to exceed
the cost under most real-world applications. Given
the wide application of rule-based expert systems
in various problem domains, the proposed methods
can potentially lead to significant financial saving for
organizations.
One limitation of the proposed methods is that they
are computationally intensive. In a future study, one
could simplify the methods to reduce their complexity.
For instance, when computing the CT table, it is pos-
sible that the accuracy may not degrade much even if
we consider only a small subset of the possible true
vectors given a reported vector. The computation time
can be significantly reduced if a subset of vectors can
be identified and used in constructing the trees.
Endnote
1An example of such data is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Credit_card_interest.
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